

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P) NORMS  
BY THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE IN SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

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by

AUGUSTIN HODALI, MAJOR, RWANDA DEFENSE FORCES, LLM  
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 2011

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Name of Candidate: Major Augustin Hodali

Thesis Title: The Implementation of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Norms by the African Standby Force in Sub-Saharan Africa

Approved by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Thesis Committee Chair  
Gary B. Cordes, MA

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
O. Shawn Cupp, Ph.D.

\_\_\_\_\_, Member  
John Tutterow, J.D.

Accepted this 9th day of June 2017 by:

\_\_\_\_\_, Director, Graduate Degree Programs  
Prisco R. Hernandez, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT (R2P)  
CONCEPT BY THE AFRICAN STANDBY FORCE SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA, by  
Major Augustin Hodali, 91 pages.

In 2005, the United Nations adopted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) to allow international intervention to protect civilians against genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity. This concept constituted hope for the African continent, which has the biggest number of the armed conflicts compared to other continents. Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act mandates the African Union to forcefully intervene to stop grave breaches of international law. The establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF) in 2003 equips the African continent to implement the R2P concept. The African Union had success in the DRC, but had mitigated successes in Darfur and Somalia. However, the operationalization of the ASF has been slow due to lack of required financial and logistical capabilities. As a result, the AU was unable to activate the ASF to intervene in the destructive war in Mali. Consequently, some African states created the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Conflicts (ACIRC) as a stopgap while the ASF continues to being built. ACIRC has the same mission as the ASF, but allows states to finance and equip this force themselves. The ACIRC constitutes a duplication of efforts, but would benefit operationalization of ASF in implementation of R2P.

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## ACRONYMS

ACIRC	African Capacity for Immediate Conflicts to Conflicts
SF	African Standby Force
AU	African Union
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
PSC	Peace and Security Council
R2P	Responsibility to Protect
REC	Regional Economic Communities
SADC	Southern Africa Development Community
SADCBRIG	Southern Africa Development Community Standby Brigade
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

The sub-Saharan Africa has gone through armed conflicts for few decades. In addition, parties to these conflicts are often responsible of grave violations of international law. In his article, Chiziko states that civilians, rather than combatants, are the main casualties of ongoing conflicts, with women and children constituting the highest number of the victims (Chiziko 2007, 74). This alarming situation prompted the African Union to search for solutions. At the international level, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) civilians in conflicts was adopted by the United Nations (UN) in 2005 through Security Council Resolution 1674 (UNSC 2006, para. 26). The efforts of the African Union coincided with the introduction of the idea of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) at the international level.

According to the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, the Responsibility to Protect involves two alternative propositions. The first emphasizes that states have a primary responsibility to protect their citizens from war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing; and secondly, where states are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens from such crimes, the responsibility is transmitted to the international community (United Nations General Assembly 2005b, para. 138). While the UN Resolution emphasizes the responsibility of states to protect its citizens against the aforementioned horrors , the Resolution gives express authorization to the international community to intervene in any case where the state fails to protect its population against war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and ethnic cleansing (United Nations

General Assembly report 2005b, para. 139). The R2P concept, as provided in this document would give solutions to the recurring conflicts in Africa. The African Union quickly has endorsed the Concept. The African Union (AU) adopted a Common African Position on the proposed reform of the UN known as the “Ezulwini Consensus,” and the concept was consequently adopted (Mahadew 2011, 7). In addition, the AU highlighted the importance of empowering regional organizations to take actions as the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Security Council (UNSC) are far from the scenes of conflict, which may hinder a proper appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations (Ezulwini Consensus 2005, 6).

The first time the UN Security Council operationalized R2P was in response to the 2011 Libyan Civil War. Based on the situation that prevailed in the country, the UN decided to launch an intervention in Libya with an aim to protect civilians. Researchers and academics were happy to announce a positive paradigm shift in managing international conflicts that threaten the lives of innocent civilians (Bellamy 2008, 136). However, despite all efforts made in the adoption of the Responsibility to Protect, the African Union did not choose to intervene in the Libya (Twinomugisha 2013, 78). The author points out that the AU opted for peaceful means whereas the international coalition had already decided a no-fly zone over Libya in order to protect civilians (Twinomugisha 2013, 79). Despite robust mandates for peacekeeping missions, civilians continue to be victims of armed conflicts, even where peacekeepers are deployed (Chiziko 2007, 76). Similarly, despite a good R2P concept, the United Nations has not mitigated or slowed progress of breaches of international law, as expected because the same crimes continue to be committed throughout Africa. A case in point is the situation

in South Sudan (Human Right Watch, 2017) and the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (Human Right Watch, 2016) where grave breaches of international law are still being committed. The creation of the African Standby Force sounded like a great step in the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. However, the challenges to the ASF operationalization are still enormous. Moreover, many academicians viewed the creation of the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises as a duplication of efforts, which may weaken the ASF before its operationalization. This study aims at assessing why the ASF is suitable and needs support in order to efficiently implement the R2P norms.

#### The Creation of the African Standby Force (ASF)

The ASF was created in 2003 and is part of the African Union Peace and Security Architecture (African Union Commission 2003). The African Standby Force (ASF) is a continental African and multidisciplinary peacekeeping force composed of military, police, and civilian contingents that operate under the control of the African Union leadership (Warner 2015, 59). The multidisciplinary force is designed to be activated in case of violent conflicts involving genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity on the African continent. The ASF HQs is located at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and has a Continental Logistics Base (LOGBASE) in Douala, Cameroon. According to Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC), the ASF is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents, made up of military, police, and civilian components in their countries of origin, and are ready for rapid deployment upon appropriate notice (African Union Commission 2002, Art.13). The ASF is not an African an established

army, it is rather made of pledges from AU member states and the Regional Economic Communities (REC) for the provision of forces when needed (de Coning and Kasumba 2010, 14). The first of these regional military bodies to be created was the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) force. Other REC standby brigades established on the continent include the East Africa Standby Brigade (EASBRIG), Force Multinationale de l'Afrique Centrale (FOMAC), Southern Africa Standby Brigade (SADCBRIG), and North Africa Regional Standby Brigade (NASBRIG) (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 11). The *ASF Policy Framework and the Roadmap for the Operationalization of the ASF* provides for the establishment of a “Rapid Deployment Capability” (RDC) with capabilities of intervening within fourteen days in cases of genocide and other grave breaches of international law (Burgess 2011, 122). The ASF Policy framework clearly provides a workable strategy for the R2P civilians, and each territorial entity is equipped with that capability.




Figure 1. Map of African Sub-Regional Standby Brigades

*Source:* Billy Batware, “The African Standby Force: A Solution to African Conflicts?” accessed 30 April 2017, <http://acuns.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/AfricanStandbyForce.pdf>.

#### The Intervention of the SADC Standby Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The intervention of the ASF is rare so far, but its intervention in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2013 left a positive landmark (International Peace Institute Issue Brief 2013, 2). In 2012, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) faced a non-international war against an armed group known as the Movement of 23 March, also known as M23. The conflict involved various armed groups, which fought on either side, and the local population was under serious threat of war crimes and crimes against humanity. In November 2012, the SADC forces intervened in the DRC to stop the advance of the M23. The SADC Intervention Brigade was attached to the existing UN

Mission Stabilization Mission in Congo (MONUSCO), a UN peacekeeping force operating in DRC, and formally became part of the UN peacekeeping effort in the country (IPI 2013, 3). Following an efficient use of robust force, the brigade managed to stop the M23 advance and defeated it. This success was unprecedented in the UN operations, and further demonstrated that regional organizations can boost the UN peacekeeping efforts to protect civilians. The UN peacekeeping operations have been deployed in the DRC for a long time, but it has not been able to effectively protect people from crimes against humanity and war crimes (Venugopalan 2016, 8). According to some scholars, the lack of effectiveness of the UN peacekeeping operations is due to lack of appropriate resources (Richey 2011, 15). The achievement of the SADC Interventional Brigade in DRC North Kivu is a case study that shows that sub-regional entities can make a difference. Based on the achievements of the SADC Intervention Brigade attached to the MONUSCO in DRC, it may be assumed that the involvement of such sub-regional organizations can boost the UN efforts, which are criticized of not doing enough to protect civilians. Consequently, it is the author's view that the UN would further use this framework to enforce R2P objectives. The aim of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the ASF using various case studies, including the Force Intervention Brigade in the DRC.

#### Primary Research Question

The primary research question is to assess why the African Standby Force would be in a good position to implement the R2P norms in the Sub-Saharan Africa.

### Secondary Research Questions

In order to provide reasoned answers to the primary question, it is also paramount to address the following questions: What are the UN strategic objectives to enforce R2P? What are the capabilities that the African Standby Force requires to implement R2P norms?

### Assumptions

The UN and AU have the requisite legal provisions to ensure the implementations of the R2P objectives. The ASF has been created as a tool aimed at implementing the R2P. In order to efficiently implement its mission, the ASF structures are decentralized in African Sub-Regions. Accordingly, Africa Standby Force has set up military standby brigades embedded into each Sub-Regional Economic Community that are able to ensure peacekeeping and peace enforcement on the continent. The decentralization of the ASF is an effective means of ensuring peace. For instance, The SADC Force Intervention Brigade and the AMISOM missions have succeeded due to their commitment to help member-state based on shared security threats, economic interests, and country neighborhood.

### Definition of Terms

War Crimes: War crimes are acts that constitute a serious violation of the law of armed conflict that trigger an individual criminal responsibility. Article 8 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, acts of war crimes include intentionally killing civilians or prisoners, torture, destruction and pillaging of civilian property, hostage taking, perfidy, using child soldiers, rape, declaring that no quarter will be given, and the use of weapons that cause

superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering (United Nations General Assembly 2011, Statute 2002, Art. 8).

Crimes against Humanity: Article 7 of the Rome Statute defines “crime against humanity” as any of the following acts when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge of the attack (United Nations General Assembly 2011, Statute 2002, Article 7):

- (a) Murder;
- (b) Extermination;
- (c) Enslavement;
- (d) Deportation or forcible transfer of population;
- (e) Imprisonment or other severe deprivation of physical liberty in violation of fundamental rules of international law;
- (f) Torture;
- (g) Rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity;
- (h) Persecution against any identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural, religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court;
- (i) Enforced disappearance of persons;
- (j) The crime of apartheid;

(k) Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health.

Crimes against humanity are different from other war crimes in the sense that they may be committed both during peace and war times.

Genocide: Article 1 of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide defines the term “genocide” to mean any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group (United National General Assembly 1948, Article 1) as such:

- (a) Killing members of the group;
- (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Ethnic Cleansing: Ethnic cleansing is a systematic forced removal of ethnic or religious groups from a given territory by a more powerful ethnic group, with the intent of making it ethnically homogeneous (UNSCR 798 1992b, 2).

Continental Logistics Base: The African Union’s Continental Logistics Base (LOGBASE) is a logistic hub that was set up to support the African Standby Force. The AU LOGBASE is located at Douala, Cameroon (ISS 2015, 3).

African Union: Peace and Security Council: Article 20 (bis) of the Constitutive Act (article 9 of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act 2003) defines the Peace and Security Council as the organ of the AU responsible for the prevention,

management, and resolution of conflicts. It is a key component of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), which is the organ responsible for the AU mechanisms for promoting peace, security, and stability in Africa.

M23: The Movement of March 23, also known as M23, was a rebel military group based in the eastern regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, mainly operating in the province of North Kivu. Its war against the Congolese government was one of the most violent in North Kivu, and triggered the intervention of the SADC Standby Brigade (Gil 2012, 1).

SADC: SADC stands for the Southern Africa Development Community. It is a sub-regional organization in Africa, which members include South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Angola, and other countries in the southern part of the continent (Government of India, Ministry of External Affairs, 2017).

### Limitations

The researcher is concurrently conducting this research while he is also following other studies at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Therefore, time constraints may constitute a limitation for the results. However, since the research methodology does not involve any fieldwork, the author will consider only resources available in the Combined Arms Research Library (CARL). In addition, the R2P concept and the African Standby Force are both subjects, which have extensive literature therefore needing ample knowledge by the researcher. Accordingly, the researcher is committed to come up with the required data on the subject.

### Delimitations

The African continent is composed of countries grouped in sub-regional organizations. However, the basis for an insightful scope of this research will focus on the Sub-Saharan Africa, because North Africa has not yet set up an ASF standby brigade. In terms of the subject matter, this research focuses the capabilities of the African Standby Force to implement the R2P norms. In terms of time scope, the research will cover the period from the replacement of the OAU by the AU in 2001 to the present. However, the research will remain flexible to refer to examples deemed relevant to the scope.

### Significance of the Study

The purpose of this study is to assess why the ASF has the required capabilities to conduct peacekeeping or peace enforcement in countries where the security of innocent civilians is at stake. It is anticipated that the successful completion of this research will greatly contribute to the academic body of knowledge. Moreover, the research will advocate for the need to support the African Standby Force with a view to protect civilians under great danger of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide. Likewise, this research will contribute to greater knowledge of the African common security and defense policies as well as the R2P norms.

### Summary and Conclusions

Chapter 1 introduced the topic of this thesis. This chapter also provided the background of the Responsibility to Protect framework since its adoption by the UN until to date. This chapter provided the background of the ASF, and stressed the importance

for its activation in cases of violent conflicts involving grave breaches of International Law. The chapter 2 literature review will emphasize on relevant literature to provide accurate answers to this research.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### Background

The primary research question of this thesis is to analyze the effectiveness of the African Standby Force (ASF) in implementing the R2P concept. In order to conduct a proper analysis on its capabilities, it is important to understand both the background the African Standby Force and the Responsibility to Protect. Chapter 2 will therefore provide detailed literature on the evolution of the two subjects, as well as challenges associated with them. In order to have an idea of both the R2P and the ASF, ample data will be availed on different military conflict situations that are considered as case studies for as far as this research is concerned. These case studies will include the conflict in Darfur (Sudan), as well as the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and Somalia conflicts.

#### The Formalization of the Responsibility to Protect

The horrible devastation of World War II and the attempts to thwart this extensive aggression created the need for thinking of how better to maintain peace and security. This has resulted in the creation of the United Nations (Knight and Cupp 2016, 1). Knight and Cupp point out that under the UN charter, nation states do not have the authority to initiate hostilities under the UN construct, unless under self-defense. Article 51 of the UN Charter regulates the self-defense in cases of imminent or current attacks. Hence, Article 51 gives rights to all nations have to conduct self-defense (Knight and Cupp 2016, 1). Moreover, based upon the constructs of international humanitarian law (IHL) principles

and responsibility to protect (R2P) concept, nations can intervene to stop a government from committing atrocities against their citizenry (Knight and Cupp 2016, 1).

Welsh posits that two important events in the 1990s served as an impetus for the international community to initiate intervention in cases breaches of international law. The genocide in Rwanda reminded to the UN of its responsibility to protect civilians (Welsh 2011, 3). Further, the 1999 NATO bombing of Serbia, designed to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo occurred without the involvement of the UN Security Council Serbia has created divisions within the international community especially about the conditions under which force should be used (Welsh 2011, 3). The genocide in Rwanda, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed in the 1990s during civil wars in Africa led to the idea that the international community has a collective responsibility to protect civilians (Welsh 2011, 3). This situation prompted the UN to set up the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) (ICISS 2008, 2). In 2001, the International Commission (ICISS) published a report that referred to the concept of “‘responsibility to protect’ R2P” (ICISS report, 11). Since then both the UN as well as the individual states have developed ideas on the R2P (Kabau 2012, 51). Several important steps have helped in the evolution of the concept. *The High Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges, and Changes*, put in place by the United Nations (UN), produced a report in 2004 (Kabau 2012, 52). The report includes a number of ideas from the ICISS report and solutions. The *Final Document of the UN World Summit in 2005* formalizes the need for implementing the R2P, and the annual reports of the UN Secretary General on the issue (Berkeley 2007, 3). The fourth and final report of 25 July 2012, highlighting the updates of the Responsibility to Protect, was submitted to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on

5 September 2012 (Bellamy 2015, 43). In that report, the authors made clear that the states have the primary responsibility to protect their populations against the most serious crimes, namely the genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes (4th UNSC Report 2012). This report was a big step forward in the field of international law, but the United Nations still needed to formalize this concept.

#### The Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty

The first important document on the R2P is the *Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (ICISS) made in December 2001 on the main theme of “Responsibility to Protect” (Kabau 2012, 51). This independent international commission was set up to reconcile the responsibility of the International Community to respond to the massive violations of humanitarian norms and the need to respect the sovereignty of states. This report led to concept of “right of humanitarian intervention” (Kabau 2012, 52). In addition, the commission provides that the responsibility to protect civilians is to be implemented primarily by states. The same responsibilities are also provided for in the *UN High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change* made in December 2004 (UN High Level Panel 2004, para. 29). This report gave the R2P an operational character, supporting the right for the UN to use force for humanitarian reasons (Cupp and Knight 2016, 19). The United Nations was to adopt the High Level Panel report for further implementation.

#### The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit

In 2005, the United Nations produced a report called “The Outcome Document of the 2005 World Summit” that served as an important reference for the R2P. In the

*Outcome Document*, the UN refers to the “responsibility to protect,” specifically, as the duty to protect populations against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The document further states that governments “are willing to carry out timely and decisive collective action through the Security Council, in case peaceful means are inadequate and national authorities are manifestly unable to protect their citizens (United Nations General Assembly 2005, para. 138). According to the document, actions had to be taken to prevent further serious and massive violations of humanitarian rights, like those taken place in Rwanda and Srebrenica.

After the World Summit Outcome Document, the new concept of the Responsibility to Protect became a rule embedded in an official UN document. In addition, state sovereign rights were reaffirmed, and the principle of non-intervention in internal affairs was allowed only for humanitarian purposes (United Nations General Assembly 2005, para 139). However, the fact that states have sovereignty over their territory and population implies their responsibility to protect civilians in case of human rights violations (United Nations General Assembly 2005, para 139). Whereas the document highlights the first duty to protect civilians lies more on individual states, the document also provides the responsibility to protect as a new universal approach; thus, making a collective obligation a new concept (para 139). The 2005 document reminds states, international organizations, and the international community as a whole, of its obligations of prevention, protection, and prosecution of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. According to Kabau, this is a solemn confirmation of the R2P. The author also insists that such violations are prohibited by the fundamental principles of human rights including the *jus in bello* (the law of armed

conflict) and *jus cogens* (peremptory norms) of public international law (Kabau 2012, 52). The Outcome Document also emphasizes the steps that can be taken, both individual and collective, as diplomatic, humanitarian, and other peaceful means that coerce, based on chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter (United Nations General Assembly 2005, para 139). It is important to highlight here that the R2P concept implementation was to go through the existing framework of the UN Charter of 1945, as provided for under Chapters VI, VII, and VIII.

### Pillars of the R2P

The 2005 Outcome Document of the UN World Summit and the Secretary-General's 2009 Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect provides three Pillars of the Responsibility to protect (Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide 2014).

1. The First Pillar provides that a state has the primary responsibility to protect its own people from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing (UN Security Council 2009, 9). This provision highlights the principle of state sovereignty as enshrined in the UN Charter (United Nations 1945, Art.1 para 4).
2. The Second Pillar mentions that the international community has a responsibility to help and encourage states in implementing the R2P (UN Security Council 2009, 9). This provision relates to the preventive initiatives of the international community to ensure a concerned state fulfills its constitutional responsibilities as well as obligations contained in the R2P concept.

3. The last Pillar provides that it is the responsibility of the international community to use existing diplomatic, humanitarian, and other means as appropriate to protect populations from these crimes (UN Security Council 2009, 9). More specifically, the 2005 document provides that, in case a State is manifestly unable or unwilling to protect its populations, the international community must take collective action to protect the populations in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter (United Nations 1945, Chapters VI, VII, and VIII).

#### Available Ways for Protection of Civilians

Although the UN Secretary-General had set the third Pillar of R2P as “resolute and timely response” in his first 2009 report, it became prompt and decisive in 2012 (Bellamy 2015, 50). In order to implement this norm, the UN identifies ways that it needs to use it, especially one of the aforementioned Pillars. Although situations may differ, the United Nations can ensure implementation of the R2P through many means. These include peaceful means of conflict settlement provided in the UN Charter (United Nations 1945, Chapter VI). Chapter VI and the use of coercive are means provided for under Chapter VII in case of threats to international peace and security, or aggression (Wolfgang 2008, 48. In addition, the UN Security Council can make use of the regional Agreements provided for under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter in case of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide (Nasu 2011, 381). Other means include the International Criminal Court, a judicial institution, which is competent to ensure justice and human rights protection. Its investigations and trials can serve as a positive and preventive initiative to discourage perpetrators (Cassese 1998, 9).

Although the UN may use coercive means to implement the Responsibility to Protect, peaceful means are preferred. The political or diplomatic processes, negotiation, mediation, good offices, investigation and conciliation, and judicial processes, arbitration and the International Court of Justice, and non-coercive actions are given preference in accordance with chapter VI of the UN Charter (UN 1945 Chap.VI). For instance, the UN supported the government of Burundi in 1993, by helping to prevent atrocities (Jackson 2006 5). However, the UN Security Council may also use coercive means under Chapter VII and VIII of the Charter, when peaceful means fail to reach the desired end state (Kabau 2012, 56). The Charter also provides some actions like the freezing of assets belonging to troublesome leaders, the suspension of financial aid, freezing diplomatic relations, or authorizing the use of force (UN 1945, Art.33). However, some actions like the embargo or the freezing of assets have more impacts on the local populations than leaders.

#### The African Union and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

In response to the international community's failures in stopping the genocide in Rwanda, all nations gathered at the 2005 UN World Summit endorsed the R2P doctrine (Chiziko 2007, 74). The doctrine posits that sovereign states have the primary responsibility to protect their citizens, but if a state is unable or unwilling to protect its own citizens, the responsibility falls on international community shoulders (Chiziko 2007, 74). Likewise, the Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU Act) provides for the right of the AU to intervene in a member state in cases of war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity, and other gross violations under Article 4(h) (Chiziko 2007, 74). Based on the AU provisions of the AU Constitutive Act, the AU member states are able to

adequately operationalize Article 4(h) in order to protect civilians, prevent genocide, and other gross violations of International Law. In addition, the AU has made a step forward to establish the African Standby Force, which it can activate to implement the R2P. The Protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU) calls for the development of a rapid reaction capacity of the African Union Standby Force (ASF) that builds on the military capabilities of African regional organizations (AU PSC). The ASF mission is to address security problems on the continent, especially with regard to the protection of civilian populations in armed conflicts (Chiziko 2007, 75).

### The Ezulwini Consensus

The African Union was quick to endorse the Concept of the Responsibility to Protect. In March 2005, the AU issued the Ezulwini Consensus in a form of declaration. The declaration reflected the common African position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations (Murithi 2007, 4). The Ezulwini consensus was a statement made in response to the *UN Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change*, issued in December 2004. This statement served as an endorsement of the UN Responsibility to Protect Concept (R2P).

In this declaration, the African Union (AU) adopted a Common African Position on the proposed reform of the UN and was consequently adopted (Mahadew 2011, 7). In addition, the AU highlighted the importance of empowering regional organizations to take actions as the General Assembly of the United Nations and the Security Council (UNSC) are far from the scenes of conflict, which may hinder a proper appreciation of the nature and development of conflict situations (Ezulwini Consensus 2005, 6).

Therefore, the Ezulwini Consensus was the adoption of UN reforms, including the R2P concept.

#### The African Standby Force (ASF)

The African Standby Force was created in 2004 to enable the PSC to assume its responsibilities, including the deployment of peacekeeping missions and peace intervention to prevent war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity (Levitt 2003, 118). This force is composed of standby multidisciplinary contingents with civilian and military components from different member states, ready to quickly deploy in different conflictual situations. The ASF is one of the essential components of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) alongside the Panel of the Wise, and the continental Early Warning System (Bah, et al. 2014, 46). The architecture of the PSC of the African Union is modeled after the UN Security Council (UNSC). Like the UNSC, the PSC Protocol, adopted in July 2002 gives it wide powers in the prevention, management, and resolution of conflicts (AU PSC Protocol). Unlike the former Organization of the African Union (OAU), the AU has adopted a clear framework to intervene in conflict zones, and consider diplomatic or military action when circumstances so require (Williams 2011, 1). The ASF peacekeepers selected and trained for joint missions can be rapidly deployed in six “scenarios,” each corresponding to the type of crises prevailing (Kasumba and Debrah 2010, 15).

The aim of establishment of the African Standby Force is to finding solutions to the persistence of conflicts and the instability in some African countries. The construction of an African architecture of peace and security is aimed at facing the increase in the

number of peacekeeping operations (PKO) and the relative increase of ownership of its challenges (Casparini 2016, 20).

#### African Standby Force (ASF) Deployment Scenarios

The African Standby Force has its headquarters at the African Union headquarters in Addis Ababa and has five brigades, one in each economic region of the continent (Cilliers and Malan 2005, 1). The primary role of the five regional brigades is to generate and prepare forces, planning, logistics, and other support during ASF deployment. The scenarios outlined below illustrate the composition of key resources within one of the regional brigades showing the ASF structure and its associated deployment timelines as showed by six missions and scenarios (Aboagye 2012, 3).

Scenario 1: AU-regional military advisor to a political mission (advisory role).

Deployment to be conducted within thirty days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 2: AU regional observer mission co-deployed with UN mission.

Deployment to be carried out within thirty days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 3: Stand-alone AU regional observer mission. The mission has to be established within thirty days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 4: AU regional peacekeeping force under Chapter VI and preventive deployment missions. The mission is to start within thirty days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 5: AU peacekeeping force for complex peacekeeping missions. The deployment is requires to start within thirty days of an AU mandate.

Scenario 6: AU intervention in cases of grave circumstances like genocide and other grave breaches of human rights. Deployment required within thirty days of an AU mandate provided by the AU (African Union Commission. 2003, chapter 1 para. 1.6).




Figure 2. ASF Organization Structure

*Source:* Solomon Appiah. “50th Anniversary (OAU/AU) Evolution of Peace.” *Good Governance and Public Policy: Equity and Justice Form the Foundation of Enlightened Ethical Leadership* (blog), WordPress, accessed 30 November 2016, <https://solomonappiah.com/tag/ghana>.

### The African Standby Force (ASF) Functions

As per Article 13 of the PSC Protocol, the ASF is to be composed of “standby multidisciplinary contingents, with police, civilian and military components, in their countries of origin and ready for deployment on short notice” (de Coning and Kasumba 2011, 36).

The ASF functions include:

1. Observation and monitoring missions.
2. Other types of peace support missions.

3. Intervention in a member state in respect of grave circumstances or at the request of a member state in order to restore peace and security, in accordance with Article 4(h) and 4(j) of the AU Constitutive Act.
4. Preventive deployment to prevent (i) a dispute or a conflict from escalating, (ii) an ongoing violent conflict from spreading to neighboring areas or states, and (iii) the resurgence of violence after parties to a conflict have reached an agreement.
5. Peacebuilding, including post-conflict disarmament and demobilization.
6. Humanitarian assistance to alleviate the suffering of civilian populations in conflict areas and support efforts to address major natural disasters.
7. Any further functions as may be mandated by the PSC or the Assembly of Heads of State (PSC Protocol, Art. 13).

#### The AU Conflict Management and Deployment of ASF

In order to intervene in a conflict, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) use means at its discretion (Berhe and De Waal 2015, 16). The council can make use of the collective action of the Council itself or its President, the President of the AU Commission, or the Group of Wise. The Group of Wise is composed of five, high-level African personalities from various segments of the society, recognized for their outstanding contribution to the cause of peace, security, and development on the continent. The Group of Wise performs consulting and training assignments to the SPC and the AU Commission (Abdellaoui 2009, 2). In addition, the PSC is equipped with a Continental Early Warning System (CEWS). The CEWS is, theoretically, an observation and control center called the “Situation Room,” located at the Department of Conflict

Management and the Union, responsible for collecting and analyzing data based on an appropriate module of early warning indicators (African Union 2002, Article 12(2)(b)). According to Article 13 of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) Protocol, it is envisaged that the ASF can be deployed in two types of situations: the peace support missions and the intervention provided for under Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act (African Union Art. 13). The two possible mission frameworks are different. Whereas peace support missions are deployed in case of conflicts of various levels as envisaged by ASF mission Scenarios 1 to 5, the intervention applies only with regard to specifically defined circumstances such as war crimes, genocide, and crimes against humanity as covered by the ASF Mission Scenario 6. According to Dersso, the information and analysis from the CEWS usually forms the basis on which the AU Chairperson and the PSC considers the planning for African forces' deployment. The CEWS is, therefore, an important institution in the framework of the decision-making process in line with the deployment of an ASF mission (Dersso 2010, 75).

#### Case Studies on the AU Peacekeeping Force in the Sub-Saharan Africa

##### The Force Intervention Brigade of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) in the DRC

###### Case Summary

The most recent example of military intervention by an ASF Brigade was in the Democratic Republic of Congo in 2013. The Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the SADC intervened as an African force in the armed conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This intervention was in response to large-scale attacks by the Mouvement du 23-Mars (M23) group on Goma town in November 2012. Consequently,

the ASF Intervention Brigade from the SADC region was integrated in the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), a UN peacekeeping force that was already deployed in the DRC. The brigade became a UN peace enforcement military force created by the Security Council Resolution 2098 in March 2013 with a clear mandate to neutralize armed groups in eastern Congo (International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations 2014).

The deployment of the SADC Brigade was originally an African and regional initiative endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. This intervention responded to the crisis in the two provinces of Kivu in eastern DRC despite the long presence of the UN peacekeeping mission (MONUC) (Boutellis 2013, 2). In February 2013, the African Union supervised the “Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of Congo and the Region,” in Addis Ababa, which served as a basis of a military solution to the M23 rebellion, also known as the Movement of 23 March (McKnight 2014, 2). On this basis, the AU came up with an idea of the Force of Intervention (FIB). The brigade deployed in October 2013 in Kivu provinces and operated alongside the Congolese army during the operations against armed groups in DRC. Manned with 3,069 soldiers, the Intervention Brigade was composed SADC member countries troops. These troop-contributing countries are mainly of South African, Tanzanian, and Malawian. In November 2013, these operations led to the liberation of all areas that were held by the M23 rebel group as well as destroying its entire military bases (BBC 2013). The intervention of this UN regional force has critically helped to defeat the M23 rebel movement. Therefore, the MONUSCO

Intervention Brigade in East DRC provides an idea of how the ASF may conduct their peace operations in order to meet the AU PSC objectives.

### The AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

#### Case Summary

Somalia is another state where the AU has done a lot to promote the R2P in the context of its armed conflict. In 2007, dangerous attacks conducted by Al Shahab against the Somali people prompted the African Union to act. Al Shabab is a militant group affiliated to Al Qaeda terrorist group known for their merciless terrorist activities (Hansen 2013, 2). Al Shahab militias constitute a brutal terrorist group that has terrorized the Somali population for decades, killing thousands of innocent civilians. According to Rwengabo, the Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) was led by East African states, but with minimum chances of success where more powerful Western nations had failed (Rwengabo 2016, 91). However, AMISOM troops have managed to protect civilians and government institutions amid the volatile situation.

The situation was dangerous prior the deployment of the AMISOM, thus causing insecurity in the region. Irit Back wrote that the Al Shabab terrorist group had overthrown the elected government, thereby conducting piracy attacks in the Indian Ocean (Back 2012, 1). These actions were endangering the African continent, especially the East African Community. Consequently, the African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) mandated the AMISOM in January 2007. Its mandate was to create conditions for the return of peace in Somalia, contribute to the stabilization of the situation in the country. In addition, AMISOM had a mandate to create favorable conditions, assist, and protect the Somali Transitional Federal Institutions STFI (United

Nations Security Council 2007). Based on its mandate, AMISOM conducted offensive operations against Al Shebab militias with a view to impose peace. AMISOM largely contributed to the retreat of the Islamic Shebab militias, liberated key towns, and strengthened the position of the Somali Transitional Government (Back 2012, 1) across the country. Despite the high rate of causalities, the AMISOM troops have succeeded in restoring the national sovereignty and hope for peace. The AMISOM forces are essentially from east Africa, namely from Burundi, Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. Although debatable, some observers consider Somalia as one of the successes of the African Union peacekeeping despite the challenges of the AU mission in Somalia (Nduwimana 2013, 13). However, notwithstanding their success, the AMISOM troops do not have the necessary logistical resources to put an end to the terrorist actions of the Shebab militias, a reason that is prompting the need for an exit strategy (Williams and Hashi 2016, 12). The mission lacks helicopters and ships to dominate the whole Somali country (Williams and Hashi 2016, 1). Thus, one of the main criticisms of this mission concerns in particular its dependence on external financing (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede 2012, 2). As of today, AMISOM is the only peacekeeping operation under AU command and control, and the biggest and most complex peace operation ever conducted by the continental organization (Rwengabo 2016, 94).

The mission owes its success to the intervention of Ethiopia and Kenya. However, these countries have always chosen to retain their operational autonomy while cooperating with the AU forces (Williams and Hashi 2016, 11). However, AMISOM has achieved tremendous results through the independent action of these countries, through the resolute engagement of regional countries such as Burundi, Djibouti, and Uganda

(Rwengabo 2016, 118). These AMISOM forces maintained a military presence across Somalia, and conducted offensives operations that are slowly restoring the country's sovereignty (Rwengabo 2016, 92).

Apart from the East Africa, troops contributing countries (TCC) of AMISOM are also from the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). According to Olu and Dauda, IGAD is a regional trade bloc in the eastern part of Africa that was founded in 1996, and has its headquarters are in Djibouti City. It comprises eight countries located in the Horn of Africa, Nile Valley, and the African Great Lakes. These countries are Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, Sudan, South Sudan, Kenya, and Uganda (Olu and Dauda 2015, 135). The initial objectives of IGAD were about development and famine issues. Olu and Dauda explain that the establishment of IGAD aimed to provide solutions to the problems of famine, which often follows recurrent droughts in the region. However, the mission of the IGAD has expanded to include other objectives. In fact, the organization expanded its initial objectives to take on other issues, such as peacekeeping, security and conflict resolution (Olu and Dauda 2015, 135).

### The AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

#### Case Summary

The armed conflict in the Darfur region is another example where the African Union intervened to protect civilians. The Darfur region is located in the western part of Sudan and its inhabitants are mostly of black communities. The Darfur conflict is often described in the media as being fought between “Arabs” and “Africans” (Ekengard 2006, 12). The armed conflict started from 2003 when armed black rebels started attacking the government forces in defense of the rights of Darfur people. During the conflict, the

Darfur population was victims of attacks by either government forces, pro-government militias, Darfur rebels, or diseases. Around 200,000 to 400,000 people were estimated to be killed, while 2.5 million others were forced to flee their homes, either as internally displaced persons (IDPs) inside Darfur or as refugees in neighboring countries (Peter Kagwanja and Patrick Mutahi 2007, 1). According to many academicians, the conflict was a genocide since the government militias were targeting black populations. Consequently, the Sudanese President Al-Bashir was, charged in July 2008 with genocide and crimes against humanity, on allegations that he orchestrated systematic killings, rape, and deportation using Janjaweed militia groups against ethnic minorities (Hughes 2010, 9). The Darfur conflict was a test for the international community after the 1994 genocide against Tutsis in Rwanda, which it had failed to stop.

By 2007, the Darfur conflict became more complex following the splintering of Darfur black rebels and clashes between Arab tribes in the area (Ekengard 2006, 16). In addition, the IDP camps became a source of insecurity as such, many armed groups have brought operated into the camps (Ekengard 2006, 16). In 2004, as the conflict was worsening, the AU conducted a mediation between warring parties, which led to the signing of the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement (HCFA) between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Army/Movement (SLA/M) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (Birikorang 2009, 4). However, the HCFA implementation was a challenge the since the SLA/M started to sprint in different factions because of its violations by parties. Soon after the signing of the HCFA, the SLA/M was fragmented into factions, many of which did not recognize the peace agreement (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012, 14). This situation increased attacks on civilians ensued, thus increasing the worsening the existing

humanitarian crisis. The Darfur peace process continued in a view to address the crisis. Thus, the search for peaceful settlement was concluded by the signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) by the government of Sudan and SLM/A in Abuja in May 2006 (Gramizzi and Tubiana 2012, 14). However, despite these peace negotiations efforts, the conflict continued between the Government of Sudan and armed factions who were non-signatory to the DPA.

The 2004 HCFA peace deal allowed the deployment of AU Military Observers to monitor breaches to the cease-fire agreement. According to Boutellis and Williams, the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) went from 150 initially (in 2004), up to 2800 in 2005, upgraded to 7000 peacekeeping troops in 2006 before it was finally absorbed into a UN led mission (UNAMID) in early 2008 (Boutellis and Williams 2013, 2). Eighty Military Observers were deployed in Darfur following the HCFA agreement. In 2005, the AMIS Peacekeeping force deployed both peacekeeping troops and the Military 80 Observers in four sectors across the Darfur region. The peacekeeping force was upgraded to 7000 the next year (Boutellis and Williams 2013, 2). AMIS was quite different from both the AMISOM and the FIB in that its peacekeepers were drawn from different RECS of Africa. Troop Contributing Countries for the AMIS were Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Gambia, and Kenya (Murithi, 2012, 92). The AMIS mandate provided by the UN Security Council Resolution 1706 included the protection of civilians “under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity” and within its “resources and capability.” However, the logistical and financial resources were scarcely lacking.

The AMIS was unable to fulfill the PSC mission due to lack of financial and logistical backup. AMIS logistic resources were also insufficient for achieving its mission

(Murithi 2012, 93). For example, the AU mission had no armed helicopters, and AMIS relied on contracted civilian helicopters for tactical air mobility (Ekengard 2006, 22). In addition, only external donors funded the mission. The African Union had no ability to provide extra funds that were required (Keith 2007, 155). Keith also points out that though underfunded and understrength, AMIS was praised for improving the security situation and received credit especially in UN Security Council Resolution 1706 for reducing violence in Darfur (Keith 2007, 154). However, AMIS's efforts have been unable to end the human rights violations in Darfur and its contributions were generally inadequate.

The other reason for its inability to play the protective function that the PSC assigned to it is largely that it was undermanned. Keith points out that the force was inadequate to secure enough the vast Darfur's territory. For a region roughly the size of France, a force of 7,000 soldiers is inadequate for providing meaningful security. As the humanitarian situation was deteriorating, AMIS lacks the capabilities to conduct proactive military patrols and provide the protection for civilian and humanitarian aid delivery (Keith 2007, 154).

The AMIS journey ended in 2007 with the establishment of the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur UNAMID) that replaced it. Based on the worsening humanitarian situation, the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, authorized the deployment of a potential 26,000 strong UNAMID force through Resolution 1769 on 31 July 2007 (Birikorang 2009, 7). The insufficient logistics, funds, and personnel were the main issues of AMIS. Before its transformation into UNAMID, the UN initiated programs to address those issues. According to Ekengard, the United

Nations initiated the Light Support Package and Heavy Support Package programs. The ‘Light Support Package’ was related to technical assistance composed of military, police, and civilian advisors whereas the ‘Heavy Support Package’ was the provision of more troops including enablers such as engineering units (Ekengard 2006, 24). Finally, the transfer of authority between AMIS and UNAMID was effective from January 1, 2008. Thus, AMIS was praised for improving the security situation despite the lack of sufficient personnel, finance, and equipment.

The cooperation between AMIS and the Government of Sudan (GOS) was not at the best level. According to Murithi, the AU mission was ineffective primarily because the Sudanese government prevented its effective functioning (Murithi 2012, 94). The lack of conducive understanding with the Government of Sudan slowed and complicated the conduct of AMIS patrols. Researchers are of the idea that the uneasy relationship between the Sudanese Government and AU mission constituted one of the major causes of its failure (Murithi 2012, 94)

### Summary and Conclusion

Chapter 2 provided data on the background of both the ASF and the R2P. The background on both subjects allowed the researcher to provide data for an analysis on the ASF capabilities, challenges, and way forward. Chapter 2 also reviewed the available data on the R2P and challenges for its implementation in Africa. For a better understanding of the relevance of both subjects in the context of peacekeeping in the Sub-Saharan Africa, the researcher provided three case studies on the African Union intervention in armed conflict situations. These case studies are the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) for the Darfur conflict, the Force Intervention Brigade in the

Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo and the African Union Mission in Somalia.

Chapter 3 will provide the research methodology used during the course of this research.

## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

#### Introduction

The primary research question of this thesis is to analyze the effectiveness of the ASF in implementing the R2P concept. The research methodology adopted for this thesis is the qualitative methodology using a case study research design (Vissak 2010, 371). The research uses a case study analysis (Creswell 2014, 43) on the African Union Missions in Sudan and Somalia, as well as the SADC Force Intervention Brigade in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The researcher will conduct this study using variables identified in chapter 2 (See Table 1). The RAND's publications *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers; Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010), and its companion volume, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers; Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Christopher, et. al. 2010) used in this research constitute a commendable source for a case study research design.

#### Research Methodology Definition

This study uses the qualitative methodology using a case study research design (Creswell 2014, 43). Qualitative data are the rough material that researchers collect from the domain they are studying and form the basis of analysis (Bogdan and Biklen 1992, 106). However, words often are the raw materials that qualitative researchers analyze, and much advice from researchers discusses analyzing these words (Bogdan and Biklen 1992, 106). Qualitative research method comprises interviews and observations, but may also include case studies, surveys, and document analysis (Savenye and Robinson 2001).

The qualitative method of research helps better in bringing to light answers to the questions asked in chapter 1. For the purpose of this study, the study has used the case study design as a research method.

### The Case Study Design

The case study research methodology will form the basis for this study. Lenth expounds that the case study methodology emphasizes on detailed conceptual analysis of key events or conditions and determines how they relate to each other. Lenth explains that not all sample size problems are the same, nor is a sample size equally important in all studies. For example, the ethical issues in an opinion are very different from those in medical experiments, and the consequences of an over or under-sized study differ (Lenth 2001, 190). Vissak adds that the research methodology using Case studies is a very useful method as it allows illustrative theories by putting together the existing theoretical knowledge with new experimental discernments (Vissak 2010, 371).

The study uses the case study research design methodology to conduct an analysis of the ASF effectiveness. Using the RAND case study methodology, the author will analyze three cases where the African Union peacekeepers conducted peacekeeping missions. The selected AU peace missions are the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo, the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the African Union Mission in Darfur (AMIS). Based on the observations by this research, the model has a very good chance of achieving the end state, which is to assess the effectiveness of the ASF. In order to conduct a coherent study, the author used the method found in the case

studies in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies*, published by the National Defense Research Institute (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010).

#### Criteria for the Selection of Case Studies

The AMIS, AMISOM, and the FIB of the MONUSCO can offer good lesson learnt to the African Standby Force development. Ekengard points out that it is worse it examining the initiatives of peace operations undertaken by the AU before the creation of the ASF (Ekengard 2006, 40). In fact, the peacekeeping operations on the African continent fall under the responsibility of the African Standby Force (Mwanzia 2015, 32). According to Ekengard, the lesson learnt will help to plan on equipping the ASF with a robust rapid-reaction capability to deal with crises on the African continent (Ekengard 2006, 40). The AU played a pivotal role in these peacekeeping operations. Guicherd clearly highlights that the experience of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) offers useful lessons that should be built into for the ASF development (Guicherd 2007, 1). According to the author, the AMIS case offers lessons on the requirement for a variety of stakeholders to get actively involved in the ASF operationalization (Guicherd 2007, 1). The AMISOM case study also offers another perspective. Whereas it achieved some strategic targets, this AU mission has failed to quickly achieve its targets because of personnel issues as well as logistical and financial constraints (Hull and Svensson 2008, 8). The other peacekeeping operation in which the AU played a key role is the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the MONUSCO in eastern DRC. This Brigade was provided by the SADC and is one of the 05 Brigades of the African Standby Force. According to researchers, the specific measures that the FIB took to protect civilians in the eastern DRC have increased local public expectations (Caparini 2016, 31). The UN force has

used robust force for providing a physical protection to civilians in the eastern part of DRC (Caparini 2016, 31). Therefore, there are a number of lessons that can be drawn from both the AMIS, the AMISOM and the FIB for the appropriate operationalization of the ASF.

#### Criteria for Selecting the RAND Model for Analysis

In order to explain the case studies and to determine the effectiveness of the African Standby Force, the study has selected specific variables identified in chapter 2. The analysis will be based on three cases studies of AU peacekeeping missions and their analysis will be conducted using the same method as per the case study analysis in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010).

The choice of the RAND format was guided by the way it was efficient in analyzing military institutions that have similarities with the peacekeeping operations. Friis states that the Peacekeeping Operations ‘capstone doctrine’ and the *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual* doctrines share similarities in many areas. The author explains that those commonalities include the focus on protection of civilians, international coherence, host nation ownership and the use of intelligence in support of operations (Friis 2010, Abstract). The use of the RAND format in the case study research design is therefore suitable to analyze the efficiency of the ASF concept for implementing the R2P since it worked well for the analysis of a similar doctrine.

### Definition of Variables

The study has selected a number of variables identified from the literature review in chapter 2, which will be analyzed when assessing the three case studies. The study categorizes the variables to be used in chapter 4, under three sub-headings. These sub-headings are security, political, and economic dimensions. Table 1 provides all the variables. These variables constitute the major factors that influence the effectiveness of African Union missions. The variables were drawn from chapter 2 of this thesis. The first grouping of variables under the security includes the shared security threat and the conduct of joint operations with the host nation. The political variables include the fact of belonging to same regional bloc, the existence of a political framework and the financial and logistical support. Lastly, the economic variables include the shared regional economic interests and the impact of the conflict on economic activities in the region. These variables will help the study to come up with a rational analysis.

The variables chosen for these case studies should be understood in the context of the peace operations case studies under review. The variable on regional peacekeepers means that the troops deployed for the peace operation are from the same Regional Economic Community (REC), political framework means that the peace operation is backed by a prior or ongoing peace agreement that define the mandate of the peace operation. As for the adequate financial and logistical support, this variable means that the peace operation has enough logistical and financial support from either international organizations or individual countries. The shared security threat means that either the Troop Contributing Countries or the entire REC have common threats related to the conflict at hand. The conduct of joint operations with the host nation means that the

peacekeeping forces operate or not with the host nation's security forces when discharging their mission. Enough troops in relation to the mandate shall mean the availability of enough peacekeeping troops in relation to the mission as provided for in the mandate and according to the nature of the threat. In the context of this study, the variable on impact on economic activities means economical negative impact on the REC or on individual countries inside the REC deriving from the armed conflict at hand. Finally, the shared economic interests means common projects or any economic undertaking of the REC or a group of countries in the REC, that has the overall aim of developing and increasing the wellbeing of people in the region.

#### Grading of Variables

The RAND model provides ranking of variables with a “1” for present and a “0” for absent. This model will be used in this research to confirm or negate the existence of a given variable. However, a definitive “presence” or “absence” of some of the variables used cannot be confirmed in this study because of a number of factors. These factors may be like the lack of enough information, the conflicting information from scholars, or the inability to understand some variables in certain situations. Whereas the study has made a faithful effort to comment on each variable, these factors constitute a limitation to these efforts. However, these limitations will not affect the analysis in this case.

Table 1. Sample Matrix				
AU peace missions in the Sub-Saharan Africa	AMIS Darfur/Sudan 2004-2007	AMISOM Somalia 2007-To date	FIB DRC 2012-to date	
<b>FACTOR</b>				
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	
<b>POLITICAL VARIABLES</b>				
Regional peacekeepers (from REC)				
Political framework				
Adequate Financial and Logistical support				
<b>SECURITY VARIABLES</b>				
Shared security threat				
Conduct of joint operations with HN				
Enough troops in relation to the mandate				
<b>ECONOMIC VARIABLES</b>				
Impact on economic activities in region				
Shared Economic interests				

*Source:* Author created using matrix from Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

Table 2. Interpretation of grading to be used		
Grades	Interpretation	Remarks
0	Non Present	Non-present means cases where the impact of the conduct of the AU peacekeeping in the AOR is completely absent.
1	Present	Means that the impact of the variable on the conduct of Peace operations is satisfactory or is noticed.

*Source:* Created by the author, using matrix from Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National, Defense Research Institute, 2010).

## Summary

This chapter described the research methodology and provided a definition of the qualitative methodology that was used in this research. It highlighted the methods used and underlined the methods of data collection. The research methodology used is the qualitative methodology using a case study research design. It also selected and defined the variables to be analyzed in chapter 4. The variables are grouped under three categories: the political, security and economic groupings. Moreover, each variable was defined to ensure for more precision. The chapter also explained the criteria for the selection of both the case studies and the model for analysis.

## CHAPTER 4

## ANALYSIS

### Introduction

The primary research question of this study is to assess the efficiency of the African Standby Force in implementing the R2P norms in the Sub-Saharan Africa. To achieve this, the researcher will attempt to answer the secondary research questions, which are what are the UN strategic objectives to enforce R2P? What are the capabilities that the African Standby Force requires to implement R2P norms?

The analysis of each of the three case studies will include an assessment of outlined variables in order to assess how effective the ASF needs to be for the implementation of the R2P. The assessment of each case study will help to highlight lessons learnt from each African Union led peacekeeping mission.

### Assessment on the AU mission in Sudan (AMIS)

#### Political Variables

Regional Peacekeepers (from REC): The AMIS peacekeepers were all from different African Regional Economic Communities (RECs). Sudan is a state located in the North Africa region. The Troop Contributing Countries (TCC) who deployed peacekeepers in Darfur for AMIS mission were from Rwanda, Nigeria, South Africa, Senegal, Gambia, and Kenya. Rwanda and Kenya are from the East African region whereas Senegal, Nigeria, and Gambia are members of the ECOWAS region. In addition, the existence of a Mutual Defense Pact may create a determination to support a sister country in the context of peacekeeping. In this case, there was no common defense pact

existing between the TCC states and Sudan since they are not from the same REC. Therefore, these countries were not from the same economic region as Sudan and for that reason, this variable will be scored 0 in the matrix table.

Existence of a Political Framework: The conflict in Darfur has attracted the attention of the international community, and especially Africa. It was a test for the newly established African Union to uphold its commitment enshrined in Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act. This provision allows the AU Peace and Security Council to intervene in situations where genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity are occurring to protect civilians. In this regard, the AU supervised negotiations between parties to the Darfur conflict in 2004 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. These negotiations ended with the signing of the HCFA, which allowed the deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The negotiations continued in Abuja, Nigeria, and a peace deal between the Government of Sudan and the main rebel group was signed in 2006. In fact, the AU framed the AMIS mandate based on these political negotiations provisions. Therefore, the AMIS operated within the political framework for the conduct its peacekeeping mission in Darfur. Consequently, this variable will be scored 1 in the matrix table.

### Security Variables

Shared Security Threat: The AMIS Troops Contributing Countries had no common threat with Sudan as far as the conflict of Darfur is concerned. They were from different Regional Economic Communities (REC). The existence of such shared security threat, if any, would be minimal to countries participating in the African Union peacekeeping mission in Darfur. The study has found that there was no common, direct security threat for all the AMIS TCC with Sudan, since no direct influence of insecurity

to AMIS TCCs was found. For that reason, this variable will be scored 0 in the matrix table.

Joint Operations with Host Nation (HN): The AMIS had no mandate to conduct joint operations with the Government of Sudan (GOS) Forces. The GOS was a party to the conflict, and its violations to the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) had to be monitored by AMIS as per the mandate. Therefore, as a party to both the conflict and the DPA, the GOS was not entitled to conduct joint operations with AMIS. Therefore, AMIS did not conduct joint operations with the GOS forces during its operations in the Darfur region. This variable will be scored 0 for that reason.

Number of Troops in Relation to the Mandate: AMIS lacked the required number of personnel to fulfil its mandate. The force was inadequate to secure the vast Darfur's territory. Part of the AMIS mandate was to protect civilians "under imminent threat and in the immediate vicinity" and within its "resources and capability" For a region roughly of the size of France, a peacekeeping force of 7,000 soldiers was inadequate for providing meaningful security. As the humanitarian situation was deteriorating, AMIS lacked the capabilities to conduct proactive military patrols and provide the protection for civilian and humanitarian aid delivery (Keith 2007, 154). Based on these facts, the AMIS was under-manned to conduct such a protective mandate. Therefore, this variable will be scored 0 in the matrix table.

#### Economic Variables

Shared Economic Interests: The AMIS TCC originated from different RECs. Although they are all African countries, they are not located in the same economic region and majority of countries involved in the AMIS are located far from Sudan. Therefore,

there was no common economic perspective that the TCC countries were interested with in Sudan. Similarly, there were no joint investment plans that TCC were protecting in the region. Therefore, the shared economic interest variable shall be scored 0 in the matrix table.

Impact on Economic Activities affecting TCC Member Countries: Sudan is part of Africa, and its insecurity affects the global African economy in one way or another. However, the countries involved in the Darfur peacekeeping operation were located far from Sudan. That means that the impact of the Darfur conflict on TCC countries was minimal. Based on that assumption, this variable has been scored 0 in the matrix table.

#### Assessment on the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)

##### Political Variables

Regional Peacekeepers (from REC): The AMISOM peacekeeping troops originated from two African regional groupings, the East African Community (EAC) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). The countries that have sent troops in the AMISOM peace operations are Burundi, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Kenya, Burundi, and Uganda are members of the East African Community, whereas Ethiopia and Djibouti Somalia are members of the IGAD. However, Kenya and Uganda are members of both EAC and IGAD. The explanation to this situation is that Somalia is a neighbor to both EAC and IGAD member countries. Therefore, the study concluded that the AMISOM peace operations are supported by regional organization, thus fulfilling the requirement of the regional peacekeeping variable. The fact that troops participating in this peace operation originate from two different regional organizations

does not change anything in this regard. Consequently, this variable will be scored 1 in the matrix table.

Political Framework: In this conflict, the Somali federal government troops are fighting against the Al Shebab terrorist organization. The aim of the AMISOM operations is to support the Somali Transitional Government in defeating Al-Shabaab. Like Al Qaeda, Al Shebab uses terrorism to achieve its objectives. Accordingly, this terrorist group has been unwilling to negotiate with the Somali Transitional Government since the beginning of its attacks. Consequently, AMISOM conduct its enforcement operations in an environment where there is no political framework between warring parties. Therefore, the political framework variable will be scored 0 in the matrix table.

Adequate Financial and Logistical Support: The AMISOM troops have financial and logistical gaps in their operations against Al Shebab in Somalia. According to some researchers, the lack of required logistical and financial capabilities is a big challenge for AMISOM. According to Williams and Hashi, AMISOM does not have the necessary logistical resources to put an end to the terrorist actions of the Shebab militias, prompting the need for an exit strategy (Williams and Hashi 2016, 12). This AU mission lacks helicopters and ships to dominate the whole Somali country (Williams and Hashi 2016, 1). The AMISOM financial challenges are also immense. Wondemagegnehu and Kebede argue that the dependence on external financing is one of the main criticisms of this mission because since African states are unable to provide financial backup (Wondemagegnehu and Kebede 2012, 2). Therefore, the variable on financial and logistical support will be scored 1 in the AMISOM matrix table.

## Security Variables

Shared Security Threats: Al Shebab has bases and territories it controls in Somalia, but also threatens Somalia neighboring countries. In the recent past, Al-Shabaab has been able to conduct attacks in Kenya and Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia respectively (Bryden 2014, 8). These terrorist attacks are carried out by attacking innocent people using IEDs. The porous borders of these countries facilitate Al Shebab to conduct the terrorist activities. Since 2010, Al-Shabaab wages terrorist attacks in countries neighboring Somalia, more especially Kenya. Bryden states that the terrorist group has conducted as many as thirty attacks in Kenya alone (Bryden 2014, 8). The July 2010 Kampala bombings and the September 2013 attack on Nairobi's Westgate Mall are the two of the most devastating cross-border attacks committed by Al-Shabaab (Bryden 2014, 8). Moreover, the Al Shebab is active and threatens strategic towns like the Mombasa seaport, which are vital for the region. The Mombasa seaport serves the neighboring land locked countries of Burundi, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Sudan, Uganda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Buluma 2014, 13). Based on these facts, it is evident that countries that provided Peacekeepers for AMISOM have common security challenges, deriving from the Somali terrorist group actions. Therefore, the common security variable will be scored 1 in the AMISOM matrix table.

Conduct of Joint Operations with host Nation: AMISOM peace operations have the responsibility to support the Somali Transitional Government. As a result, the AU peacekeepers support the Somali security forces and conduct joint operations with them when fighting against Al Shebab terrorist fighters. This support aims to create favorable conditions for the exercise of Somali state powers on its territory. The support of the

Somali security forces by the AMISOM troops helps the AU missions to win hearts and minds of the local population because it becomes evident that it is working in the interest of the Somali people. The variable related to the joint operation with the host nation is present in this case study, which is the reason why it will be scored 1 in the AMISOM matrix table.

Enough Troops in Relation to the Mandate: AMISOM peace operation has approximately 18,000 uniformed personnel from both IGAD and East African community (Nduwimana 2013, 11). In accordance with the AMISOM mandate, these troops conduct operations on almost the entire territory of Somalia with such a small number of personnel. Caron and Oral point out that although AMISOM has achieved a noticeable level of its objectives, it is undermanned, which is one of the reasons it cannot be quickly achieve its objectives (Caron and Oral 2014, 276). In fact, the UN has asked the African Union (AU) to increase the troop strength of AMISOM from 17,731 to a maximum of 22,126 uniformed personnel in order to implement the mandate. Based on the vast area of responsibility, AMISOM does not have the required number of military personnel. Therefore, the variable on required troops in relation to the mandate will be scored 0 in the AMISOM matrix table.

### Economic Variables

Negative Impact on Economic Activities of TCC Member Countries: Al Shebab actions in the East African region are evident. Some countries, including those who provided troops for the AMISOM peace operations, suffer from the economic impacts of the terrorist group militancy. The case in point is Kenya whose economy is affected by the insecurity caused by Al Shebab. For example, Kenya had a substantial decrease in

influx of tourists from 2011, due to Al Shebab terrorist actions (Kipkemboi 2010, 96). Similarly, Al Shabab-linked pirates are increasingly threatening the Indian Ocean, which affects imports and exports of countries in the east African community and the Horn of Africa. The Al Shebab actions have therefore affected national economies of some states in the region, including those participating in the AMISOM peace operations. Consequently, the variable on the impact on economic activities because of Al Shebab terrorist actions is evident in this cases study. This variable has therefore will be scored 1 in the AMISOM matrix table.

Shared Economic Interests: The shared economic interests constitute a valid reason to combine efforts for the eradication of Al Shebab terrorist group in the East African Community (EAC) and the Horn of Africa. The EAC has particularly established a Common Market Protocol in 2010, which increased the integration and market opportunities. Similarly, countries in the Horn of Africa are working towards a common agenda for developing, and a long-term vision of their economic region. These regions have common strategic vision and projects aiming at the economic development of their respective economic regions. Al Shebab threatens economies of the countries in that region and complicates the import and exports of goods. In addition, the insecurity created by the terrorist group affects the free movement of people of the region and tourists. This situation complicates the shared economic opportunities of states of the East African Community and Horn of Africa regions. Therefore, the variable on shared economic interests is present in this case study, which is the reason it will be scored 1 in the AMISOM matrix table.

## The SADC Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) in Democratic Republic of Congo

### Political Variables

Regional Peacekeepers: In 2013, the ASF Brigade of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) intervened into the DRC conflict with a view to build peace as part of the MONUSCO, an already existing UN mission. Also known as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB), this SADC Brigade supported the DRC armed forces in fighting and defeating the M23. The success of the SADC FIB was mainly due to the strong political commitment of the neighboring countries in the sub-region as well as the involvement of the SADC in which the DRC is a member state. In 2003, the SADC member states established a Mutual Defense Pact with an aim to defend and safeguard the freedom of their populations (SADC 2014, Preamble). Article 6 of the Mutual Defense Pact provides that any armed attack against a SADC member state shall be considered as an attack to the region, and shall necessitate a collective action of its member states. The FIB Troops Contributing Countries were all from the SADC region. These SADC troops came with an aim to support a SADC member country that had security issues. The robust peace enforcement they conducted along with the Congolese Armed Forces in the eastern DRC allowed a quick defeat of the M23 Rebel group. The success in defeating the M23 was possible because of the willingness of the SADC to support its member country in accordance with the Mutual Defense Pact. The variable on regional peacekeepers was therefore a key factor in the success of the mission.

Considering this situation, this variable will be graded 1 in the FIB matrix table.

Political Framework: The FIB deployment was preceded by a determination by neighboring states to the DRC to support the peace process in that war torn country. In

February 2013, eleven countries of the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) signed the Framework for Peace, Security, and Cooperation for the DRC and the Region. The Framework Agreement created obligations of the parties including neighboring countries, the armed groups, and the HN for supporting the DRC peace and stability process. This agreement created a firm basis for the deployment of the FIB troops and allowed its success. It is evident that such viable political framework has eased peace enforcement operations and contributed to the defeat of the M23. The political framework in this case study was paramount to the success of the FIB. Therefore, this variable will be scored 1 in the FIB matrix table.

Adequate Financial and Logistical Support: The FIB offensive operation against armed groups in DRC was also successful because it had adequate logistical support. Sheeran and Case highlight that the Force Intervention Brigade was equipped with attack helicopters, long-range artillery, armored personnel carriers, special forces, snipers, and even drones (Sheeran and Case 2014, 2). The Intervention Brigade's offensive operations employed its full range of capabilities, and enjoyed an efficient logistical and financial support of the MONUSCO. More specifically, the use of drones has greatly improved capabilities of the FIB operations. Thus, the Intervention Brigade has been able to carry out and support the Congolese government forces offensive operations because it had adequate logistical support. The variable related to the financial and logistical support constitutes a big asset for success recorded in this case study. Therefore, this variable will be scored 1 in the FIB matrix table.

## Security Variables

Shared Security Threat: Based on the Mutual Defense Pact, the armed attacks against the DRC can be legally considered as attacks on the SADC regional body. Article 6 of the Mutual Defense Pact provides that any armed attack against a SADC member state shall be considered as an attack to the regional bloc, and shall necessitate a collective action by its member states. Based on the SADC Mutual and Defense Pact, the armed conflict in DRC was considered as a challenge to the bloc, thus needing a collective intervention by SADC member states. The involvement of SADC countries was therefore based on shared security concerns, and had the objective of supporting a state from the same regional body. Based on these facts, the variable of the shared security threat was evident in the FIB case study. The shared security threat variable has therefore will be scored 1 in the FIB matrix table.

Conduct of Joint Operations with HN: The success of the FIB was possible mainly because of the conduct of joint operations with the Congolese Armed Forces. The conduct of joint operations with the Congolese Armed Forces against the M23 helped to defeat it, and left a positive landmark in the conduct of UN peacekeeping operations. The fact that the MONUSCO supplied requisite logistical backup to the Congolese Armed Forces was a considerable boost of their capacity to efficiently fight against illegally armed groups in the east. The variable on joint operations with the host nations is therefore evident in this case study. Accordingly, the variable will be scored 1 in the FIB matrix table.

Enough Troops in Relation to the Mandate: The SADC FIB was manned with 3,069 troops. The brigade topped off an already existing UN force (MONUSCO). The

MONUSCO itself was authorized with a troop ceiling of 19,815, which made it to be the largest and most expensive UN mission worldwide by 2012 (Jessica Hatcher, 2012).

According to the data provided for in chapter 2, the deployment of the SADC FIB allowed the MONUSCO to gain operational efficiency, which helped to defeat armed groups like M23. Based on the MONUSCO strength and capabilities, it is obvious that this UN force had required capabilities to fight the armed groups in eastern DRC. Therefore, the variable on the strength of the FIB will be scored war in the FIB matrix table.

#### Economic Variables

Impact on Economic Activities on the SADC Member Countries: The armed conflict in the DRC has a negative impact on the SADC region business activities. The SADC is a regional economic community with a mission to enhance the economic development and liberalize intra-regional trade in goods and services (SADC 2014, Art. 2). The regional bloc has established an open market to promote Economic Growth and Sustainable Development so that people in the region have better living standards and employment opportunities. In such environment, a conflict in one SADC member state constitutes a barrier to the overall objectives of the regional organization. Therefore, armed conflict in DRC was and is still considered a challenge to the economic development and the intra-regional trade in the SADC. This clearly justifies the SADC peace enforcement operations in the DRC armed conflict. The variable on economic impact is thus present in this case study, and will be graded one in the FIB matrix table.

Shared Economic Interests: The SADC member states have embarked on the economic integration, a situation that has created more opportunities in the region. The

free trade in the region has created a larger market and increased the potential for trade, economic growth, and employment creation. This regional integration may generate increased domestic production, greater business opportunities, and access to cheaper inputs and consumer goods (Mauritius Chamber of Commerce 2014). According to BBC, the DRC has limitless water sources, a benign climate, and fertile soil with abundant deposits of copper, gold, diamonds, cobalt, uranium, coltan, and oil. These deposits of minerals make DRC one of the world's richest countries, if well managed (BBC 2013). The economic opportunities that the DRC can offer to the SADC are, therefore, immense. However, these economic opportunities need a secure environment, which the DRC does not have. The intervention of the FIB in DRC was thus an attempt to secure these economic opportunities. The DRC is one of the SADC countries that has considerable amounts of natural resources (Lehmann 2015, 5). Other considerable projects of the SADC include the development of infrastructure. For instance, Caholo has estimated the SADC Infrastructure Project Portfolio to be approximately U.S. \$50 billion (Caholo 2012). This is an investment project that shall further allow free movement of goods and persons within the region. Based on the availability of natural resources and current investment projects of the SADC, the region has attractive investment opportunities. Therefore, the variable on shared economic interests is obvious in the FIB case study. Consequently, this variable will be graded 1 in the FIB matrix table.

Table 3. Consolidated Matrix Table

AU peace missions in the Sub-Saharan Africa	AMIS Darfur/Sudan AMIS 2004-2007	AMISOM Somalia AMISOM 2007-to date	FIB DRC FIB 2012-to date
<b>FACTORS</b>			
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
<b>POLITICAL VARIABLES</b>			
Regional peacekeepers (from REC)	0	1	1
Political framework	1	0	1
Adequate Financial and Logistical support	0	0	1
<b>SECURITY VARIABLES</b>			
Shared security threat	0	1	1
Conduct of joint operations with HN	0	1	1
Influence of insecurity to other member states	0	1	1
<b>ECONOMIC VARIABLES</b>			
Impact on economic activities in region	0	1	1
Shared Economic interests	0	1	1

*Source:* Created by author, using matrix from Christopher Paul, Colin Clarke, and Beth Grill, *Victory has a Thousand Fathers: Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Santa Monica, CA: National Defense Research Institute, 2010).

#### Interpretation of the Matrix Table

The assessment of variables shows many lessons-learned that a strategist could build on for the operationalization of the ASF. As a starting point, the AMIS, AMISOM, and MONUSCO FIB missions share interventions in violent, armed conflict situations with a likelihood of grave breaches of international law. The intervention of AU forces in both situations was for the protection of civilians. The RECs from states in conflict provided troops for both AMISOM and the FIB missions. The FIB has adequate

personnel as well as required logistical and financial support for missions where AMIS and AMISOM missions lack adequate resources. The logistical and financial backups create added advantage, which has allowed the FIB to succeed in defeating some armed groups in the eastern DRC.

The assessment points out that both AMISOM and FIB are constituted of troops from the same REC. Belonging to same REC creates a will to ensure security in the host nation because of shared security threats. In addition, the insecurity in the host nation can have negative impact on the safety in the region, a situation that creates the need to fight against such an outcome. The analysis also highlights that both AMISOM and FIB conduct their operations in conjunction with the host nation's security forces. Military operations conducted together with host nation forces are more efficient because it becomes easier to gather information on adversary forces. Moreover, apart from the efficiency, operating with local security forces creates legitimacy of the peace operation and long-term conditions for the host nation to gain control of the area. It is, therefore, obvious that AMISOM and FIB working with host nation forces has allowed the two peace operations to register great success in their operations.

The conducive security environment is an important factor for RECs to reach their development goals. The insecurity in one state obviously creates negative economic impacts in other countries of the regional organization. The assessment of both AMISOM and FIB suggests the variable on negative economic impact was a reality in their respective regions, and this creates a need for the RECs to help the host nation for the sake of protecting economic interests of the entire region. Accordingly, the armed conflict in the host nation may endanger the shared economic investment projects and

other shared economic interests. These factors create the will for the REC to do more in restoring security in the host nation, and are one of the factors behind the successes for both the AMISOM and FIB operations.

### Challenges of the African Standby Force

A number of challenges have delayed the ASF operationalization process. The first and main challenge of the ASF is the lack of adequate and sustainable funding. According to Beza, the ASF was perceived as the African solution to African issues, but it lacks adequate and sustainable financial commitment from the African member states (Beza 2015, 455). The African states' annual contributions, from 2008 to 2011, are equivalent to 2 percent of the AU's Peace Fund that encompass peace and security initiatives, whereas the remaining funds come from external donors (Beza 2015, 455). As a result, the AU-led peacekeeping missions depend on external financial support for peacekeeping missions. For example, the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) relies entirely on external funding, which limit the African states' autonomy (Williams and Hashi 2011, 22). The lack of sustainable funding for the ASF is also one of the main issues that have hampered the ASF operationalization process (Beza 2015, 453).

The other hurdle for the operationalization of the ASF is the insufficient logistics. It is important to mention that African countries possess the required troops for the ASF operations. However, logistical capacities including equipment, communications, transportation needed to sustain the ASF operations are still insufficient. According to de Coning and Kasumba, this situation again, creates dependence on external donors (de Coning and Kasumba 2010, 18). This situation complicates the ASF operations and remains one of its major challenges. The AU and RECs/RMs need to develop logistical

capacities in order attain full operationalization of the ASF. Further, engaging the UN and other organizations for funding the ASF operationalization is also a viable alternative.

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Lastly, competitions between hegemonic AU member states can also constitute a barrier to the operationalization of the ASF. Competitions between regional and sub-regional hegemonies like Nigeria and South Africa, Ethiopia and Kenya, Egypt, and Libya (while Khadafi was still in place), respectively, is a serious hindering factor (Beza 2015, 453). For example, Beza points out that hegemonic competition between Egypt and Libya (under Gaddafi) in the Maghreb region was one of the reasons why the establishment of North brigade lags behind other Regional Standby Brigades, whereas Nigeria's and South Africa's regional hegemony also shaped ECOWAS' and SADC's agenda to their advantage (Beza 2015, 453). In fact, According to Brossig and Sempijja, the misunderstanding between South Africa and other African nations over the

operationalization of the ASF was behind the creation of the African Capacity Immediate for Response to Crises (ACIRC) (Brossig and Sempijja 2015, 4). However, some scholars view the ACIRC as a distortion of efforts that are needed to strengthen the ASF.

### Summary of Chapter 4

Chapter 4 analyzed the variables identified in chapter 3 using the RAND's table found in *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers; Detailed Counterinsurgency Case Studies* (Paul, Clarke, and Grill 2010), and its companion volume, *Victory Has a Thousand Fathers; Sources of Success in Counterinsurgency* (Christopher, et. al. 2010). This chapter interpreted the variables used in the matrix table, which gives an effective analysis of the ASF effectiveness. This chapter has analyzed each case study using the variables selected in chapter 3. The results of the analysis of case studies were summarized in the matrix table (Table 3). The chapter underscored that the ASF standby Brigades are more efficient in the management of armed conflict within the Regional Economic Community (REC). Chapter 4 highlighted that regional standby Brigades are more willing to intervene in regional conflict situations because of political, security and economic reasons. Although the ASF is still in the process of operationalization, this chapter has shown that it has already left a positive landmark in the DRC where the SADC Brigade intervened in 2013. The chapter also discussed the challenges facing the ASF in its operationalization process. The chapter also discusses the challenges facing the ASF and assesses the African Capacity for Immediate Response to Crises.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

The purpose of this research was to assess the effectiveness of the ASF in implementing the R2P in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although still under the operationalization process, the establishment of the ASF provided the African Union an opportunity to conduct peacekeeping operations more efficiently. Chapter 5 is organized as follows: summary of the findings discussed in chapter 4, interpretation of the findings, areas for future study, summary and conclusions, and recommendations. The establishment of the ASF provides much hope for peacekeeping in the Sub-Saharan Africa and, thereby, the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. The Regional Standby Brigades established at Regional Economic Communities level provide an immense opportunity to conduct peacekeeping with a great sense of commitment. The analysis of case studies provided in this chapter emphasized this factor. However, the lack of enough logistical and financial support is a barrier for the regional Brigades of the African Standby Force to operate efficiently.

The analytical layout of the case studies in the RAND model was adapted and used to form the basis for building a case for the need to have a robust peacekeeping approach that is able to ensure the Responsibility to Protect Concept is duly implemented. The analysis highlighted the role of the ASF Standby Brigades in conducting peace operations in the REC member countries. The analysis of the case studies highlighted the fact that Standby Brigades are more committed, based on political, security and economic relationship with the country that experiences an armed conflict in the region. Thus,

building and strengthening the ASF Standby Brigades of the Regional Economic Communities offers a viable solution to the future prospects of the Peacekeeping in the Sub-Saharan Africa.

### Interpretation of Findings

This study has highlighted factors that justify the effectiveness of the African Standby Force for implementing the R2P in the Sub-Saharan Africa. The analysis conducted in chapter 4 of this thesis was based on three case studies namely the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) of the MONUSCO in DRC. The assessment on these peacekeeping missions emphasized the factor that peacekeeping troops from the same Regional Economic Community (REC) as the host nation can be more efficient than other peacekeeping forces from other parts of the world. The fact of belonging to the same regional organization creates a will to ensure security in the host nation because of shared security, political, and economic threats. In addition, this assessment suggests that the insecurity in the host nation can have negative impact on the safety in the region, a situation that creates the need to fight against such an outcome. AMISOM and the FIB missions' successes are in line with this factor. Another important finding is that military operations conducted together with host nation forces are more efficient because it becomes easier to gather information on the adversary forces. Moreover, apart from the efficiency, operating with the local security forces build legitimacy of the peace operation and create long-term conditions for the host nation to take over control after the operations. It is therefore clear that the fact that AMISOM and FIB operate with the host

nation forces has allowed the two peace operations to register great success in their operations.

The analysis findings in chapter 4 of this study shows that RECs the conducive security environment is an important factor to reach their strategic development goals. The insecurity in one state obviously creates negative economic impacts in other countries of the regional organization. This factor also creates an impetus for the region to help the host nation for the sake of protecting economic interests of the entire region. In addition, the analysis made also suggests that the armed conflict in the host nation may endanger shared economic investment projects, and other shared economic interests. Consequently, the need to protect economic interests of the entire region generates the will for the REC to do more in restoring security in the host nation. The need to secure security, political, and economic interests is, therefore, factors behind both AMISOM and FIB operations successes. The Standby Brigades of the African Standby Force can therefore efficiently ensure the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect. Despite this opportunity, the AMISOM mission has logistical and financial challenges, which has a negative impact on the AU mission accomplishment. On the contrary, the FIB has required personnel for the mission and adequate logistical and financial support. The logistical and financial backups constitute an added advantage that allowed the FIB to succeed in defeating some armed groups in East DRC.

#### The Need to Strengthen the ASF Regional Standby Brigades

The ASF and its Rapid Deployment Capabilities (RDC) have a convenient concept for implementing the R2P. Soon after the establishment of the AU in 2000, an African Standby Force was created with a mandate to intervene in African countries in

order to stop the commission of grave breaches of international law. In order to be more effective, the ASF Standby Brigades were created in each of the four Sub-Saharan RECs. The findings of this thesis reveal that peace enforcement operations including the intervention conducted by RECs are more effective in implementing the R2P. This study has put forward the AMISOM operations in Somalia and the FIB intervention in the DRC are examples of the AU interventions to confirm the relevance of RECs in implementing R2P. The successes so far registered by these AU missions are based on the fact that peacekeeping troops originated from respective regions have upheld willingness and commitment to conduct the peace mission.

The commitment of troops from RECs is linked to the region's political, security and economic interests. In fact, the high level of commitment for the Regional Peacekeepers is related to the conviction that defending a neighbor from the same REC is defending the regional bloc's interests. Although the establishment and operationalization of the ASF Standby Brigade is an important asset for regional security environment. However, the Standby Brigade may be better established if a political integration is in place in the region. The study also reveals that that a regional bloc with a Mutual Defense Pact would deter the threats of civilian populations in member countries. Moreover, that legal framework would be conducive to conduct an intervention in the region's bloc member country in defense of both civilian populations and the region's political, security and economic interests.

The establishment of ASF and its Standby Brigades in RECs therefore constitutes a major development in implementing the R2P Concept on the continent. Even before the full operationalization of the ASF, some Regional Standby Brigades like the SADC

Standby Brigades have shown that the concept of the ASF is workable and can better implement the R2P concept. The intervention of ASF standby Brigade of the SADC in the DRC conflict suggest that the shift from traditional peacekeeping to a peacekeeping initiated by RECs troops can better accomplish the mission of protecting civilians in armed conflicts. The lesson drawn from the FIB case study is that a robust, regional peacekeeping force with ground and air support is adapted to armed conflicts that erupt within the REC. Therefore, the establishment of strong regional Standby Brigades needs to be furthered because it may bridge gaps in the implementation of the R2P.

The logistical and financial challenges constitute a barrier to the implementation of the Responsibility to Protect in the Sub-Saharan Africa. These challenges were the major reason for the failure to fulfill its mission in Darfur. However, the success of the Force Intervention Brigade was facilitated by proper logistical and financial backup. The financial commitment to the African Standby Force may allow the Regional body to acquire needed resources. These resources are mainly the air resources, and other logistical resources are for better mobility and reconnaissance.

### Recommendations

The African countries should, therefore, put their maximum effort to achieve the full operationalization of the ASF for an effective management of conflict and command and control. The Regional Standby Brigades of the African Standby Force require being fully equipped and ready for any contingency in the sub region or elsewhere. Standby Brigades need to be equipped with adequate resources since their readiness depends on their personnel and resources primarily. It is imperative to develop sub-regional rapid

reaction capacities especially by equipping them with air resources and other mobility resources.

The African states should take ownership of the African Standby Force by actively contributing to its budget. In this framework, it is recommended that each country commit a percentage of its yearly budget for the operationalization of the ASF. Moreover, the African Union should use diplomatic engagements with the main UN financial contributors to find possible financial assistance to ASF deployments.

The sub regional political and military integration is a key step to the prevention of conflicts. The integration includes political and economic integration. It also includes a Defense Pact between member states of the sub-region. The African Union should therefore ensure legal and non-legal barriers are removed for RECs to achieve political and economic integration as a foundation to their effectiveness to deal with conflict situations in their areas.

Findings of this research confirmed that the viable political framework is key to success for an African peace mission to achieve its objective. Political processes involving negotiation of the parties to the conflict is therefore paramount for the achievement of the ASF objectives during a peace operation. In this regard, the African Union should ensure a political solution is given more weight, as much as possible.

The mission achievement for the ASF also depends on efficient interoperability of the states participating in the peace mission. In the African RECs, the personnel of the Standby Brigades have different background, doctrine, and training. It is, therefore, paramount for the Standby Brigades to continuously organize training sessions involving personnel composing the brigades to ensure proper interoperability.

In case of an intervention of the ASF, the cooperation with the host nation is a key asset for the realization of the mission. This cooperation includes joint operation, training and logistical support where possible. The cooperation with host nation creates peacekeeper legitimacy, and eventually helps to prepare the host nation security force to smooth takeover once the operation is concluded. Therefore, it is recommended the African Union to ensure cooperation with the host nation where feasible.

#### Recommendations for Future Study

The operationalization of the African Standby Force has taken longer than anticipated, and African states have devised other ways to intervene if there is another violent conflict on the continent. A group of African states has created the ACIRC for that reason. Technically, the African Union has two military institutions that have the same purpose as of today. The research finds that it is not advisable for the African Union to have both the ASF and ACIRC since they serve the same purpose. It may be argued that ACIRC may divert resources that would help the ASF be fully operationalized.

Therefore, the relationship of the ACIRC and ASF needs attention in a future study.

The failure of the African Union to intervene in Libya, Mali, and Burundi recently tested the efficacy of the African Union in implementing the R2P. This inability to intervene in violent situations needs attention of researchers for more research and further recommendation on ways forward. The study would center on both the political willingness of states as well as an assessment of the powers of the African Union Peace and Security Council.

## Summary

This research assessed the effectiveness of the ASF in implementing the R2P in Sub-Saharan Africa. The study findings suggested that the African Standby Force with its Standby Brigades has the potential to be the best institution to implement the R2P concept in the Sub Sahara countries. Although still under the operationalization phase of establishment, the ASF provided the African Union an opportunity to conduct peacekeeping and intervention operations more efficiently. The successful operations during the recent intervention of the SADC Standby Brigade in the eastern DRC suggest that the Regional Standby Brigades of the ASF are in a good position to implement Scenario 6 (intervention) of the ASF Charter. The research findings indicated that the success of the REC is related to the commitment and willingness to support sister nations from the same REC. The commitment results from political, security, and economic factors shared by the regional bloc. Consequently, the political and economic integration is a requirement for a REC to efficiently manage armed conflicts in the region. It is imperative to develop sub-regional rapid reaction capacities especially by equipping the Standby Brigades with required resources.

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